Abstract. Multi-receiver authentication is an extension of traditional point-to-point message authentication in which a sender broadcasts a single authenticated message such that all the receivers can independently verify the authenticity of the message, and malicious groups of up to a given size of receivers can not successfully impersonate the transmitter, or substitute a transmitted message. This paper presents some new results on unconditionally secure multi-receiver authentication codes. First we generalize a polynomial construction due to Desmedt, Frankel and Yung, to allow multiple messages be authenticated with each key. Second, we propose a new flexible construction for multi-receiver A-code by combining an A-code and an (n, m, k)-cover-free family. Finally, we introduce the model of multi-receiver A-code with dynamic sender and present an efficient construction for that.
Introduction
Conventional authentication systems deal with point-to-point message authentication. In Simmons' model of unconditionally secure authentication there are three participants: a trunsmitter(sender), a receiver, and an opponent. The transmitter and the receiver share a secret key and are both assumed honest. The message is sent over a public channel which is subject to active attack. Transmitter and receiver use an authentication code which is a set of authentication functions f , indexed by keys belonging to a set E . To authenticate a message, called a source state and denoted by s E S, transmitter forms a codeword f ( e , s) and sends it t o the receiver who can verify its authenticity using his knowledge of the key. We are only concerned with systematic Cartesian A-codes in which the codeword constructed for s using e E E is the concatenation of s and f(e, s), that is ( s , f ( e , s ) ) , and f ( e , s ) is called authenfication tag, or simply lag. The receiver will detect a fraudulent codeword ( s , t ) if t # f ( e , s > E 7, where 7 denotes the set of all tags.
The opponent can perform an impersonation attack, or a substitution attack, by constructing a fraudulent codeword that would be acceptable by the receiver. In impersonation the attacker has not seen any previous communication while in substitution he has seen one transmitted codeword. A code provides perfect protection against impersonation if enemy's best strategy is randomly guessing the tag and in the case of Cartesian A-codes, his probability of success is Po = h.
Perfect protection for substitution is defined in a similar way and for Cartesian A-code the probability of success of the intruder is PI = h.
An extension of this model, proposed by Desmedt, Frankel and Yung (DFY) [5] , is when there are multiple receivers who can not all be trusted. Transmitter broadcasts a message to all the receivers who can individually verify authenticity of the message using their secret key information. There are malicious groups of receivers who use their secret keys and all the previous communications in the system to construct fraudulent messages. They succeed in their attack even if a single receiver accepts the message as being authentic. In an (k, n) multireceiver authentication system there are TL receivers such that in any group of k receivers, there is at least one honest receiver. In other words the largest coalition of cheating receivers can have Ic -1 members. The system provides perfect protection against impersonation, or substitution, if the best chance of success in the corresponding attacks is l / q , where q is the common size of tag space for all the receivers. A multi-receiver authentication code can be constructed from a traditional Acode by allowing transmitter to use n authentication keys for the n receivers and broadcast a codeword that is simply a concatenation of the codewords for each receiver. The length of the combined tag is n times the length of the individual receiver tags, and the transmitter's key is n times the size of a receiver's key. This is a very uneconomical method of authenticating a message as such a system can prevent attacks by even n -1 colluding receivers, while the assumption is that in every group of k receivers there is at least one honest receiver. The question is whether it is possible to have more efficient systems with shorter tags and shorter transmitter's key. Desmedt, Frankel and Yung [5] gave a positive answer t o this question by constructing a (k, n) multi-receiver A-code in which the size of the tag and the size of the transmitter's key are significantly less than that of the naive solution. Kurosawa and Obana [lo] showed that, these are the smallest sizes of the transmitted tag, and the transmitter's and the receiver's key for the given deception probabilities. In this paper we present a number of new results on multi-receiver A-codes.
-We extend DFY polynomial construction to authenticate w messages. The construction reduces the key storage of the transmitter by a factor of 2, compared to the repeated use of the DFY system.
-We give a new construction for multi-receiver A-codes by combining an arbitrary A-code and a special combinatorial structure called (n, m, k)-cover-free family. The construction is particularly useful when the number of receivers, or the size of the source is large. In DFY construction the numbers of bits needed for the tag and the keys for the transmitter and receivers are both at least log q (in this paper, all logs are in base 2), where q is a prime power that is not less the number of receivers and the size of the source states. This is an unnecessary constraint which is removed in our construction. -Finally we extend the model of multi-receiver A-code to the case where the transmitter is not determined beforehand. This model is useful for authenticated conference communication. An interesting property of this model is separating message authentication and entity authentication. Again it is possible to have a trivial construction by giving each participant the required key information for the transmitter in a multi-receiver system, but the result will be a very inefficient system. We give a construction which is much more efficient than this elementary construction.
In section 2 after recalling DFY construction, we give the extension t o multiple messages. In section 3 we give the new construction for multi-receiver A-codes and finally in section 4 we give the model and construction of multi-receiver A-code with dynamic receiver. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2

Generalization of DFY Scheme to Multiple Messages
In a multi-receiver A-code, there is a trusted Key Distribution Centre (KDC) that generates and distributes the required keys. The system has three phases:
Key distribution:
The KDC privately sends to the sender, and each re- 
Extending DFY to multiple messages authentication
Assume q is larger than, or equal to, the number of possible messages and q 2 n.
The scheme has the following steps: 
* * * + S " P W ( 2 i ) .
The above scheme is a multi-receiver authentication code in which each key can be used to authenticate up to w messages. To prove the security of the scheme, we consider the scenario where for a given key (PO(Z) 
The above two equations can be rewritten as where A , M,, B , X k -l and C denote the corresponding matrices in an obvious manner.
We first give a lemma, which says that knowing M,, X k -1 , B and C cannot determine A . In other words, the matrix satisfying (1) and (2) is not unique. 
Proof. See Appendix
Theorem 1. The above scheme is a ( k , n) unconditionally secure multi-receiver authentication code i n which every key can be used to authenticate up to w messages.
Proof. We only consider the substitution attack, the proof for the impersonation is similar. The malicious receivers P I , . . . , pk-1 , want to generate a valid code- In the following we will show that the information held by the colluders allows them to calculate q equally likely different tags for s,+l and hence their probability of success is l / q . So the probability of the k -1 receivers correctly guessing A ( z ) is l / q .
To authenticate w consecutive messages using DFY scheme, 2 w polynomials are required while in our scheme we only need w+ 1 polynomials. So the key storages for the sender ( ( w + l ) k logq) and receivers ( ( w + 1 ) logq) are reduced to % times of that of DFY scheme, while the lengths of the authentication tag for both constructions are the same (k log q). In this section we present a general construction for multi-receiver authentication by combining an A-code and a ( n , m, k)-cover-free Family.
As noted before, a trivial solution for multi-receiver authentication is to give each receiver a shared secret key with the sender, and to transmit a concatenation of the individual authenticated messages to all the receivers. The disadvantage of this solution is that it requires the sender t o store many key bits and requires a long tag for the authenticated message. DFY scheme significantly reduces the size of the key storage and the length of the authentication tag. However in this scheme the order of the field G F ( q ) must be bigger than the size of the source and the number of the receivers. Moreover success probabilities of impersonation and substitution attacks, the size of the key storage and the length of the authentication tag are all determined by q . Although it is acceptable to have the key storage, and length of the tag, a function of the probability of success, having the number of receivers and the size of the source bound by this probability is not reasonable. In this case when the size of the source or the number of the receivers are very large, the key storage of the sender and the receivers, as well as the length of authentication tag will become too large. In practice, we may deal with the scenarios that we are satisfied with deception probabilities higher than l / q , but have limitation on the key storage or communication bandwidth. So it is desirable to look at construction methods that meet such trade-offs. We note that a ( n , w, 2) CFF is exactly a Sperner family. CFF has been extensively studied by Erdos et a1 in [8] and [9] . A trivial CFF is the family consisting of single element subsets, in which n = m. Non-trivial CFFs are those with n > rn. A good CFF is the one that for given m and k, n is as large as possible.
Finding good CFFs is believed to be a hard combinatorial problem. Construction of good CFFs employs various areas of mathematics such as finite geometry, design theory and probability theory, and is beyond the scope of this paper.
Assume that (X, F) is a (n, rn, k) CFF and ( S , 7 , E , f) is an A-code without secrecy. We construct a (k, n) multi-receiver A-code as follows The proof of the theorem is straightforward. In this scheme the sender is required to store rnrloglEl1 bits, and the receiver Ri to store lBjlrloglEl1 bits. The authentication tag is of size of rnrlog 1 7 1 1 .
The following example compares this construction with that of DFY polynomial scheme. Assume that the size of source states is only one bit (for example, yes and no) and we need a (2,70) multi-receiver authentication code with the probabilities of impersonation and substitution attacks not greater than 1/2.
Using DFY polynomial scheme we need a finite field GF(q) with q 2 70; it follows that [logql 2 7, and so the sender must store at least 28 bits and each receiver must store at least 14 bits. The length of the authentication tag is at least 14 bits, and the probabilities of impersonation and substitution attack are (3)'. Now we use our construction. It is easy to see that the Sperner family consisting of all 4-subsets of a set of 8 elements gives a (70,8,2) CFF. We define the underlying A-code C = ( S , 7 , E , f) as follows. Let S = 7 = GF(2), E = GF(2)2, and f : S x E -7 be given by f(s, ( e , el)) = e + se'. Then C is an A-code with PI = Ps = $. Applying our scheme, the sender and each receiver need to store only 16 bits and 8 bits, respectively. The length of authentication tag is of 8 bits and the probabilities of impersonation and substitution attack are both 1/2. Next, we assume that the size of the source state is very large, for example 220 bits (i.e. I S 1 = 22ao). A direct computation shows that the DFY polynomial scheme for (2,70)-multi-receiver authentication requires that the sender and each receiver to store 222 and 221 bits, respectively. The length of authentication tag is 2'l bits while the probability of impersonation and substitution attacks is not greater that 1/22a0. However, in many applications the deception probability of about 1/220 might yield an acceptable security level. To this end, we choose an A-code that is constructed from universal hashing family (see [l3] ) with the following parameter: 220 bits of source state, 445 bits of authentication keys, 20 bits of authentication tag and the probability of impersonation and substitution attacks is not greater than 1/220. Combining with the (70,8,2) CFF, our construction results in a (2,70)-multi-receiver A-code in which the key storages for the sender and each receiver are of 3560 bits and 1780 bits, respectively. The length of the authentication tag is 160 bits and the deception probability is bounded by 1/220. We note that this construction is only suitable for the case when the number of malicious users is not very large compared to the total number of the users. This is due to the following result. However, in [7] using a probabilistic method the authors proved that for small k, there exists (n, O(1og n), k) CFFs. Finally, we point out that although in general the construction based on CFF does not provide perfect protection, it is more flexible than DFY polynomial scheme, since the underlying A-code can be chosen according to various requirements. For example, the A-code can be replaced by a universal hashing family, or an A-code for multiple authentication.
Multi-receiver Authentication with Dynamic Sender
In this section we study multi-receiver A-codes with dynamic sender. We consider the scenario where there is a KDC and a group of n users. The KDC privately distributes some secret information (key) t o each user. At a later time, one of the users generates an authenticated message and broadcasts it such that every other user can verify the origin and integrity of the message and a collusion of up t o a given size of the receivers cannot succeed in impersonation or substitution attacks on other receivers. We assume that in the key distribution phase, the KDC does not know which user is going to broadcast the authenticated message and hence each user is a potential sender or receiver. An obvious construction is by establishing a multi-receiver authentication system between each user, considered as the sender, and all the others, considered as receivers.
For instance, for n users Pi, . . . , P,, , using DFY (k, n -1) multi-receiver authentication scheme, gives the following construction. During the key distribution phase, the KDC randomly chooses an n-tuple of polynomial pairs of degree less than k, ( In this scheme the KDC must store 2En[log q1 bits and each user to store 2(n + k -1) [log ql bits. The length of the authentication tag for each message is (k + 1) Fog q1 bits. Since the lengths of keys for KDC and each user are of order O(n log q ) , when the number of users is very large, the overhead for the key storage both at the KDC and each user becomes very large. A multi-receiver A-system with dynamic sender has three phases: K e y distribution, Broadcast and Verijication.
To define PI and Ps, we note that because every user can be a sender, when a message is received by a user Pi, she/he must first assume an identity for the sender and then verify the authenticity of the message with respect to the assumed identity. The enemy is a set of k -1 malicious users, PI,, . . . Now the probability of the substitution attack for the system is defined as ps = max{Ps,=,,,,,,Ps.,ti,,}.
In the following we present a construction for such systems. Let S be the set of source states and assume S c GF(q) and q 2 I S 1 + n.
Key distribution:
The KDC chooses n distinct numbers ai in GF(q)\S, and gives a; to user P; ( aj) ), and so it is easy to see that even if they know M l ( a j ) ) and M2(aj) the probability that they correctly guess the value of M ( a j ) is l/q. The contribution of our proof is that it remains true even P I , . . . , Pk-1 know M l ( z ) and M z ( z ) .
This scheme requires the KDC to store %$[ l ogql bits and each user to store 3krlogql bits. The length of the authentication tag for each message is ( 2 k + 1) pog q1 bits. Compared with the construction based on DFY scheme, we see that the key storages of the KDC and the receivers are both reduced. The length of the authentication tag in this construction is about twice of the DFY scheme. The system allows message substitution and entity substitution to be separated. It is possible to halve the size of the authentication tag at the cost of only being able to detect fraudulent messages but not distinguishing the type of fraud (message versus entity). (w 2 1) symmetric polynomialsof degree less than k, using a construction similar to that of Section 2, we can generalize the scheme such that the sender (one of the users) can broadcast w authenticated messages.
2 . An interesting generalization of the model of multi-receiver A-code with a dynamic sender is to allow more than one user to broadcast authenticated messages in the broadcast stage. It is easy to see that the straightforward generalization of DFY scheme allows each user t o broadcast one message, so a total of n messages can be authenticated in the system. However, if we allow only up t o t(t 5 n ) users send authenticated messages, it is possible to reduce the key storage and the length of authentication tag. We observe that if more than one sender is allowed, then for each pair of users, for example Pi and Pj, the key information contributing to authentication from Pi to Pj must be different from that used for authentication from Pj t o Pi. Otherwise after seeing a broadcast authenticated message from Pi, anyone can perform an attack on Pi by resending the observed message t o Pi himself and claiming that this is sent from Pj . Thus the construction based on symmetric polynomial will not be suitable for multiple senders. Rather, the KDC may use polynomials in two variables and of suitable degrees t o produce the required key information. Details of this construction will be given in a future paper.
Conclusion
In this paper first we generalized DFY polynomial scheme for multi-receiver Acode so that it can be used to authenticate multiple messages instead of a single message. Next we suggested a flexible construction for multi-receiver A-codes by combining an A-code and an ( r n , n , k ) cover-free family. Finally we introduced the model of multi-receiver A-codes with dynamic sender and presented a construction that is much more efficient than the naive method. Indeed, we may choose (w + 1) distinct elements y1, y z , . . + , yw+l in GF(q), then Since (s, a*, M l ( z ) , MZ(Z)) has been broadcasted. it follows that P I , . . . 
